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have refused to find automobile manufacturers liable until the legisla-
ture establishes definitive safety standards to apply.94 Nonetheless, jury
decisions reached under strict judicial supervision can indicate to the
industry what the community regards as unreasonably dangerous design
features. The inability of the courts to fully police the industry does
not justify a failure to provide a forum for the injured plaintiff. The
Supreme Court of Florida made it clear in Hoffman that the most
pressing task of the courts is not to regulate manufacturers but to
Secure just and adequate compensation to accident victims who have
a good cause of action.95 The Evancho decision is a substantial step in
that direction.
ROBERT C. APGAR
Criminal Law-ARREST-COURT UPHOLDS THE RIGHT To RESIST AN
UNLAWFUL ARREST, BUT ISSUE SHOULD BE REVISITED UNDER NEW
STATUTE-Burgess v. State, 313 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
cert. denied, 326 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1976).
While on a routine midmorning patrol, Officer Gary Hitchcox
observed two men walking down a street in St. Petersburg. One
man left the other and cut through a yard, thereby arousing the
officer's suspicion. Officer Hitchcox circled the block twice and again
came upon the same two men walking together. One of the two split
off and started to cross a field. When the remaining man, Leon Norman
Burgess, spotted the officer's police cruiser, he yelled something to
: 94. E.g., Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Evans
V. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966); Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line
R.R.; 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
: In 1966 the United States Congress enacted the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1970), authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to establish
mandatory federal motor vehicle safety standards. Since then seatbelts, padded interiors,
collapsible steering columns, and other safety devices have become commonplace. In
the Safety Act, Congress specifically provided that "[c]ompliance with any Federal
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person
from any liability under common law." 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1970).
Apparently no court has yet considered whether a private remedy exists under the
Traffic and. Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Doak v. City of Claxton, Ga. 390 F. Supp. 753, 761
(S.D. Ga. 1975). Federal courts have inferred the existence of a civil remedy under some
federal safety statutes, however, if certain enumerated conditions are met. Id. at 759-61.
95. 280 So. 2d 431, 436-37 (Fla. 1973). See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
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the other, who then began to run. Leaving the cruiser, Officer Hitchcox
pursued the man but could not catch him. After the chase, Officer
Hitchcox tried unsuccessfully to question Burgess regarding the other
man and his own identity. Officer Hitchcox then attempted to place
Burgess under arrest for obstructing a police officer without violence.
A fight ensued, and two back-up officers called to the scene by Officer
Hitchcox were injured.'
Burgess was charged with resisting arrest with violence contrary
to section 843.01, Florida Statutes, 2 and was tried by jury. After the
State rested its case, Burgess moved for a judgment of acquittal.3 Upon
denial of the motion, Burgess submitted a nolo contendere plea to
the lesser offense of resisting arrest without violence, reserving the right
to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of
acquittal .4
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding
that Burgess could not be found guilty of resisting arrest because the
evidence failed to show any lawful basis for the arrest.5 At the same
time, the court expressed great dissatisfaction with the Florida common-
law rule that a person may not be found guilty of resisting arrest if
the arrest is unlawful. 6 But, as district appeal courts may not enunciate
a rule of law inconsistent with precedent established by the Supreme
Court of Florida, 7 the Burgess court certified the following question
to the Supreme Court of Florida: "May one forcefully resist an unlawful
1. Burgess v. State, 313 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
2. FLA. STAT. § 843.01 (1975) provides in part: "Whoever knowingly and willfully
resists, obstructs or opposes any . . . municipal police officer . . . in the lawful execu-
tion of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or
legally authorized person, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree.
3. 313 So. 2d at 480.
4. Ordinarily a plea of guilty or nolo contendere waives the right to appeal. In
Florida, however, a criminal defendant may plead nolo contendere conditioned on a
reservation for appellate review, if the question to be reviewed is one of law. See
Cheseborough v. State, 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972); State
v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
5. Under Florida's Stop and Frisk Law, FLA. STAT. § 901.151 (1975), it is permissible
for a police officer to briefly detain an individual for the purpose of making a reasonable
inquiry into a suspicious situation. But failure to disclose identity or other information
forms no separate basis for an arrest. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
6. The Burgess court, quoting the Supreme Court of Alaska in Miller v. Alaska,
462 P.2d 421, 427 (Alas. 1969), stated:
We feel that the legality of a peaceful arrest should be determined by courts
of law and not through a trial by battle in the streets. It is not too much to
ask that one believing himself unlawfully arrested thereafter seek his legal
remedies in court .... [T]he old common law rule has little utility to recommend
it under our conditions of life today.
313 So. 2d at 483.
7. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. 1973).
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arrest by a person whom he knows or has reason to know to be an
authorized peace officer?" 8
In a brief opinion, the supreme court refused to answer this ques-
tion. Since Burgess, charged with resisting arrest with violence, had
pleaded nolo contendere to a lesser offense of resisting arrest without
violence, the court deemed it inappropriate to consider the certified
question.9 Nonetheless, the court must surely face this issue in the
future. 10 The purpose of this comment is to suggest that the answer
to this question should be in the negative: the right to resist an un-
lawful arrest should be abolished.
The common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest was recognized
in England as early as 1710.1" The doctrine "developed when long
imprisonment, often without the opportunity of bail, 'gaol fever,'
physical torture, and other great dangers were to be apprehended
from arrest, whether legal or illegal.' 2 Resistance to an unlawful arrest
by an eighteenth-century peace officer did not involve the serious
dangers which it involves today.'3 Prison conditions at that time were
so deplorable that one can easily understand why a citizen would
want to resist an unlawful arrest. One writer had these comments
to make about his observations of the eighteenth-century English
prisons:
There are prisons, into which whoever looks will, at first sight of
the people confined, be convinced that there is some great error in
8. Rather than ruling contrary to precedent established by the Supreme Court of
Florida, district courts of appeal may certify a matter to be a question of great public
interest, which the Florida Supreme Court may consider, if it chooses, by writ of
certiorari. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
9. State v. Burgess, 326 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1976).
10. Florida's new resisting arrest statute, which became effective July 1, 1975, was
not controlling in this case. FLA. STAT. § 776.051(1) (1975) provides: "A person is not
justified in the use of force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer who is known
or reasonably appears to be a law enforcement officer."
This statute is unclear in that it does not specify whether it prohibits resistance
to unlawful as well as lawful arrests. A survey of the materials contained in the
Florida Legislative Library Service regarding the passage of H.R. 2179 (1975), which
later became FIA. STAT. § 776.051, revealed no significant legislative history relating
to this aspect of the bill.
California has a similar statute, and the courts there have consistently held the
statute to prohibit forceful resistance to unlawful as well as lawful arrests. People v.
Curtiss, 450 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968). But see State v. Mobley, 83 S.E.2d 100 (N.C. 1954),
where the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the offense of resisting arrest
presupposes a lawful arrest.
11. The Queen v. Tooley, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710).
12. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 330 (1942).
13. "Constables and watchmen were armed with staves and swords, and the person




the management of them: their sallow, meagre countenances declare,
without words, that they are miserable. Many who went in healthy,
are in a few months changed into emaciated objects. Some are seen
pining under diseases, "Sick, and in prison"; expiring on the floors,
in loathsome cells, of pestilential fevers, and the confluent small-
pox .... 
14
In the United States today, the weight of precedent falls with the
common-law rule.15 As early as 1900, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed a murder conviction, stating that the defendant had
the right to use such force as was absolutely necessary to resist an un-
lawful arrest.16
Florida courts have generally agreed with those authorities which
hold that an unlawful arrest even by a known peace officer may be
resisted.17 The Florida rule, however, has its limitations. An arrestee
14. J. HOWARD, THE STATE OF PRISONS 1 (1929). The following account of a con-
temporary American prison suggests that prison conditions today are not entirely
unlike those of eighteenth century England:
Robert Jordan had been sitting there in the darkness for some time. The
isolation cell was small, only six feet by eight. But the lack of ventilation and
light was what bothered him first. He sat as close as he could to the inner cell
door, a sliding row of bars, because the rear and side walls of the cell were
flecked with the urine and excrement of former occupants. . . . Three feet away,
a steel flap covered the only window. The window could let in some light but
guards kept it closed.
Twice a day, a guard opened the steel outer door, crossed the short vestibule
and slid some food and a small white styrofoam cup of water through a slot in
the inner cell door. Twice a day, another guard flushed Jordan's toilet, a circular
hole in the concrete floor, from outside the cell. Sometimes they left the outer
door open while he ate. The guards never forgot to serve the food, but they
sometimes forgot to flush the toilet or to leave the outer cell door open. He
ate with his hands but he had trouble keeping them clean because sometimes he
ran out of his daily ration of toilet paper and there was no wash basin in the
cell. Sometimes he couldn't eat because the smell was so bad.
M. YEE, THE MELANCHOLY HISTORY OF SOLEDAD PRISON 11 (1970). See Jordan v. Fitzharris,
257 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Calif. 1966), where Soledad prisoner Robert Charles Jordan
was granted injunctive relief from what the court described as "conditions . . . of a
shocking and debased nature."
15. See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); United States v. Heliczer,
373 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1967).
16. Bad Elk v. United States, 117 U.S. 529 (1900). In Wainwright v. New Orleans,
392 U.S. 598 (1968), the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether
a person has a constitutional right to resist an unlawful arrest. The court did not
reach the issue and dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. Justice Douglas and
Justice Warren, both dissenting, intimated that the right may be basic to the fourth
amendment.
17. See, e.g., Licata v. State, 24 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1945); Gay v. State, 3 So. 2d 514
.(Fla. 1941); Roberson v. State, 29 So. 535 (Fla. 1901); E.A.S. Juvenile v. State, 291 So. 2d
61 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Kirby v. State, 217 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1969).
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may not resist an arrest for the violation of an unconstitutional statute
if the statute has not yet been so declared,' and a person being un-
lawfully arrested may not use unreasonable force in resisting the
arrest.' 9
Two principles support the common-law doctrine: (1) an illegal
arrest is an assault upon the person arrested, and (2) any unlawful
interference with the fundamental right of personal liberty may be
resisted .' One commentator endorsing the common-law doctrine
eloquently stated:
[I]t is certainly consistent with fundamental fairness to excuse persons
who are provoked to reasonable resistance by oppressive and un-
lawful state action. The purpose of the right is not to encourage
violent attacks on policemen, but to preserve the sense of personal
liberty inherent in the right to reject arbitrary orders. To permit
the police to provoke individuals into committing the crime of re-
sisting arrest, creates a trap for citizens which must, in the long run,
injure the integrity of the legal system. 2"
The abrogation of the common-law doctrine could resurrect an in-
strument of oppression. A mendacious policeman could attempt to
make a patently false arrest and thereby infuriate the average citizen
into some form of resistance. Thereupon the arrestee would face the
18. Canney v. State, 298 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 892 (1975).
19. The law in Florida on the subject is most clearly summarized in Roberson v.
State, 29 So. 535, 538-39 (Fla. 1901). Quoting Briggs v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 554
(1886), the Supreme Court of Florida set forth the following principles:
" 'If one, even an officer, undertakes to arrest another unlawfully, the latter
may resist him. . . . But the doctrine * * * that nothing short of an endeavor
to destroy life will justify the taking of life prevails in this case.' . . . [W]hen
the mere fact of an illegal arrest, attempted or consummated, appears, if the
one suffering it kills the officer or other arresting person, whether with a deadly
weapon or other means, he may rely on the presumption that his mind was
beclouded by passion; but, if actual malice is affirmatively proved, the homi-
cide will be murder."
See also Alday v. State, 57 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1952).
20. Curtiss v. United States, 222 A.2d 840, 842 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966). The Curtiss
court stated that "an illegal arrest is an assault and battery, and one so arrested may
either turn and walk away or match force with force to effect his escape." See also
People v. Cherry, 121 N.E.2d 238 (N.Y. 1954).
21. Chevigny, The Right To Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128, 1150 (1969).
Chevigny suggests the following rationale for allowing the provoked citizen to be
acquitted of charges stemming from his alleged obstruction of justice: "The policeman
has initiated the situation, has confronted the citizen with an utterly arbitrary
order, and has enforced it by an act of coercion intended primarily to maintain his
authority. Such an arrest makes it difficult for any person who values his liberty to
submit." Id. at 1146.
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charge of resisting arrest, which would stand regardless of the illegality
of the initial arrest.22 The Court of Appeals of New York has aptly
described the offensive nature of an unlawful arrest: "For most people,
an illegal arrest is an outrageous affront-the more offensive because
under color of law-to be resisted as energetically as a violent assault." 23
The common-law doctrine of the right to resist arrest has come
under extensive criticism, however.2 4 At least four states have abolished
it by judicial decision, 2 and another five by statute.26 Both the Model
Penal Code of the American Law Institute and the Uniform Arrest Act
oppose the right of a citizen to forcefully resist an unlawful arrest.2 7
The original bases of the right to resist an unlawful arrest are
almost nonexistent now. In the first place, police weaponry today is
so powerful that a citizen is unlikely to escape an arrest, in contrast
to his eighteenth-century English counterpart. 2 Resisting arrest today
is a temporary evasion, merely prolonging a potentially violent con-
frontation with attendant risks of injury to arrestee, police officers, and
innocent bystanders. Furthermore, as the Burgess court recognized, the
resisting citizen has no reliable method for assessing the legality of
his arrest. The legal criterion for a lawful arrest is not the absolute
guilt of the arrestee, and a person innocent of crime or wrongdoing
may be lawfully arrested-a fact unknown to most laymen.2 9 In addi-
22. Id. at 1150.
23. People v. Cherry, 121 N.E.2d at 240.
24. See, e.g., Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 330-31 (1942);
Comment, Criminal Law: The Right To Resist an Unlawful Arrest: An Out-dated
Concept?, 3 TuLsA L.J. 40 (1966).
25. The right to resist an unlawful arrest has been abolished by judicial decision
in Alaska, Idaho, New Jersey and Ohio. Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 (Alas. 1969) (no
right to resist peaceful arrest); State v. Richardson, 511 P.2d 263 (Idaho 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 11163 (1974) (no right to resist with force or weapon); State v. Koonce,
214 A.2d 428 (N.J. 1965) (no right to resist with force); City of Columbus v. Fraley,
324 N.E.2d 735 (Ohio 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 872 (1975) (no right to resist in
absence of excessive or unnecessary force by arresting officer).
26. The common-law doctrine has been abolished by statute in California, Delaware,
Illinois, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834a (West 1970); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1257 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-7 (Smith-Hurd 1972);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:5 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAws 12-7-10 (1956).
27. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 3, § 3.04(2)(a)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); UNIFORM
ARRES AcT § 5.
28. People v. Curtis, 450 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. 1969). The Supreme Court of California
noted that "in a day when police are armed with lethal and chemical weapons, and
possess scientific communication and detection devices readily available for use, it has
become unlikely that a suspect . . .can escape from or effectively deter an arrest .... "
29. The constitutional standard for a valid arrest is "probable cause." Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The Supreme Court of Florida has defined "probable cause"
as follows:
The facts constituting probable cause need not meet the standard of conclusive-
ness and probability required of the circumstantial facts upon which conviction
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tion, the legality of an arrest is often a matter of such close debate
that reasonable persons may differ.30 Finally, a person arrested today
has the right to bail and an opportunity to appear before a magistrate
for immediate arraignment and preliminary hearing, in contrast to
the eighteenth-century arrestee's long wait in prison for the royal
judges to arrive. These contemporary facts, coupled with the civil
remedies available for those unlawfully arrested,3 1 lend credence to
the view that a citizen, believing himself to be unlawfully arrested,
need not use the forum of the public streets for the vindication of his
rights.
It appears, therefore, that the modern rule as advocated by the
Second District Court of Appeal, which prohibits resistance to an
arrest whether lawful or unlawful, is more conducive to a safe and
orderly society. Citizens should not have the dangerous option to flee
and hide whenever a peace officer attempts an arguably unlawful
arrest. Thus, while the common-law doctrine encourages violence, the
modern rule inhibits violence. The Florida Supreme Court should
adopt the modem view.32
WILBERT STEVENSON, JR.
must be based. The sufficiency of the officer's knowledge is not to be judged by an
analysis of the effect of each isolated circumstance. Rather, it is to be measured
by the test of what a reasonable man would have believed had he known all of the
facts known by the officer.
State v. Outten, 206 So. 2d 392, 397 (Fla. 1968) (citations omitted).
30. The Supreme Court of Florida has held that in a suit for false imprisonment
where there are conflicting facts on which reasonable persons could differ, the jury
and not the court makes the determination of whether probable cause for arrest
existed. Spicy v. City of Miami, 280 So. 2d 419, 421 (1974), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131
(1974).
31. In Florida, the civil remedies available are damages for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. See Sanchez v. Buchanan, 175 So. 2d 50 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965). Illustrating the difficulty of prevailing in an action for false
arrest are Carter v. City of St. Petersburg, 319 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975), and City of Jacksonville v. Walton, 318 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
32. The legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex, should apply: "The
reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases." BLACK'S LAw DiCriONARY 288 (4th
ed. 1968). The common-law doctrine which allows a citizen to resist an unlawful
arrest should not survive the expired reasons upon which it was founded.
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